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d

L

on a summer
if
"

Tr.,

earlier in
several more

beverages (Trial

left and stated, ''I'm going to go get

,P

a 12-year-old" (Trial

Ls.15-25).
that day, KG., a 12-year-old
was playing

,Ls.21-23; pA2,

12

something to
it was.

who was wearing a two-piece
Dixon

the

dragging her towards a dock on
p

1, L.13 -

by the arm and

beach behind some bushes. (Trial TL,

L.12; pA7, Ls.8-14.) Dixon told K.G. that he
he would pay

(Trial TL, pA5, LsA-9.) K.G. asked

$100 if he could tell
several times to let her

but Dixon would not do so. (Trial., p.52, Ls.3-11.) After they reached the
Idaho Supreme Court
reporter's transcripts
convictions. (11/1

Dixon's
No. 33384,
3 Order.)
1

take judicial notice of
direct appeal of the

1.)

17 ran

1-24.)
mother

of the

Tr.,

54, Ls.7-14.)

Two bystanders observed some of
sitting in Dixon's
help.

struggling to get

13 - p.105,

bystanders

interaction between Dixon

p.119,

- p.i

followed Dixon and watched
(Trial Tr., p.123, L.i0 -

other young

,L.9.)

One of

approach and interact with

136, L.1.) Meanwhile, K.G. and

mother notified police, and K. G. identified Dixon as
p.56, L. 8-

and screaming

L.8; p.60, Ls.9-14; p.201, L.18 - p.203,

confronted Dixon, and Dixon replied, "It's not

perpetrator.
16.)

(Trial Tr.,

KG.'s mother

fault your 12-year-old daughter

was staring at me." (Trial Tr., p.83, L.25 - p.84, L.10.) After he was arrested and
placed in a patrol car, Dixon kicked out the rear left window of the vehicle. (Trial
Tr., p.216, L.25 - p.219, L.12.) Later at the jail, an officer found a marijuana pipe
on Dixon's person. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.6 - p.267, L.i8.)
The state charged Dixon with first-degree kidnapping, lewd conduct with a
child

under

16,

misdemeanor

possession

of drug

paraphernalia,

and

misdemeanor injury to property. See State v. Dixon, 2007 Unpublished Opinion
No. 494, Docket No. 33384 (Idaho App., June 26, 2007). After a trial, at which
K.G. and the two bystanders testified and identified Dixon as the attacker (Trial
Tr., p.57, Ls.9-12; p.102, L.19 - p.i03, L.5; p.120, Ls.i3-21), a jury found Dixon

2

1

a
in numerous

present

(a

evidence and/or

an

arm - an

which, Dixon asserts, rendered him incapable of committing kidnapping
lewd conduct in the manner alleged by the state. (#39745 R, pp.1-5, 47-50;
1/11 "Post Trial Briefing in Support of [Dixon's] Claim Of Post-Conviction
(augmentation 2 ).) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied
petition. (#39745 R, pp.103-112; 1
n,H"Ire

0/10

Dixon filed an untimely

of appeal from the district court's denial of his post-conviction petition, and

Idaho Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. (#39745

, pp.117-121.)

Dixon then filed an LRC.P' 60(b) motion for relief from the district court's
order denying post-conviction

(10/5/11 motion (augmentation).)

The

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Dixon's motion to augment the appellate
record with his post-evidentiary hearing briefing, his I.RC.P. 60(b) motion, and an
affidavit submitted in support that motion. (11/14/13 Order.)
2

3

a

an

ht
district
1

1

timely appealed. (#40761 R, pp.1

Dixon next filed a successive
post-conviction

asserted

1 R,

of

district court granted relief and re-entered

pp.25-26,

a

post-conviction

denying
appeal. (#40761

,p.49, 71-72.)

No.

Supreme Court
appealed

to file a timely

was ineffective for

from the district court's

of

in

post-conviction

district court's denial of his post-conviction

in
, with Case

40761, in which Dixon appealed the district court's denial of his LRC.P. 60(b)
motion.

(9/23/13 Order.) The clerks' records from both cases are part of the

consolidated appellate record.

4

in

on

as:

1.

3.
I.

to show that the district court abused its
P.
motion?

5

in

!.

claim that his

cou

show that his

to object to

was

in a courtroom at
ich there is

erred in denying his post-conviction

district

Dixon contends

Kootenai County Public Safety

a county

(Appellant's

counsel was ineffective

jury trial being
ing, a building in

pp.7-17.) Dixon has failed
failing to challenge

trial venue, where no controlling

constitutionality

such a venue unconstitutional, and where authorities

a

other jurisdictions have split on the question whether such a venue is
constitutionally permissible.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
LC.R. 57(c);

==-.:~=,

111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial

court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to
great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct App.
1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact
and conciusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if
they are ciearly erroneous, but will freely review the conciusions of law drawn by

6

9

A

137,774

(1

unless it

an

of

is a strong presumption that

uct is within the wide range of

reasonable professional
P.2d 283, 286 (1986);
(Ct.

Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718

=~-'-'---'==,

1989). "[S]trategic or

appeal unless those

116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248
decisions will not

second-guessed on

are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance

of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."
v. State, 145 Idaho 148,153-54,177 P.3d 362,367-68 (2008).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174,
11

(1988); -=-=:..:.~~-=-:=.:==- 1

Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct.

7

1

do

1
to

In a

a

in the

probability of success of

motion in question In determining whether the

attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. =~.:..:.......:.:.....::::.=:::., 129
Idaho 520,526, 927 P.2d 910,916 (Ct. App. 1996). Where
IS

counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion

alleged deficiency

the motion, if pursued,

not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both
of the
Sixth

test.
provides that

accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public

all criminal prosecutions,
, by an impartial jury."

presumption of innocence is a basic component of a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S 501, 503 (1976). Practices such as shackling a defendant or requiring
him wear prison garb during a jury trial have been held to pose such a threat to
the "fairness of the factfinding process" that they must be subjected to "close
judicial scrutiny."

. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569 (1986).

A few appellate courts have expanded upon these concepts and held that
that a trial in a courtroom inside of a jailor prison is inherently prejudicial, and

8

a

was

an

or

61
a prison is
is required); ~==

, a case-by-case
S.

532

1

cond

in an administration building adjacent to prison, as opposed to prison itself, "was
not inherently prejudicial"); see also :....:::::.=~:.:....:::~~= 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 63 (Cal.
App. 2000) Uury trial conducted on

but outside actual prison

3 Other authorities have analyzed the question of
a trial held within a
correctional facility violates a defendant's
to a public trial. See Bright v.
875 P.2d 100, 109 (Alaska App. 1994); Vescusco v. Commonwealth, 360
S.E.2d 547 (Va. App. 1987). While Dixon references this right to a public trial,
and cites these cases in his Appellant's brief, he did not raise this issue before
the district court in the course of the post-conviction proceedings. (See #39745
R., pp.47-50; "Post Trial Briefing in Support [of Dixon's] Claim of Post-Conviction
Relief (augmentation).) This Court should therefore
consider this argument
because Dixon failed to preserve it. State v. Fodge. 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824
P.2d 123, 126 (1992) ("The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not
consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeaL") In any event,
the record indicates that Dixon's jury trial was open to
public. (See 12/10/10
Tr., p.53, Ls.1
.)

9

in

a
was
Safety Building, a

In

which

a

in

houses the

County Jail. (#39745

R., p.88.) There have been numerous trials conducted in this courtroom, and as

far as the district court was aware, there has never been an objection made to a
trial being held there. (#39745 R.,

90.) Aside from

from Dixon's post-evidentiary briefing,

unsworn statements

record does not

significant

information regarding the organization and layout of the Kootenai County Public
Safety

Therefore,

, and the courtroom and

was no basis by which the court could conclude that the
contained the same

of prejudice

were evident in

of Dixon's trial
=...:...:.='

and

Cavan, and that the Kootenai County Public Safety Building courtroom was not
instead more similar to the constitutionally permissible jury trial venues of Kell,
Howard, and

=..:.=..:..:..::::..4

At the time of Dixon's trial, as is still the case currently, there was no
controlling Idaho authority concerning the constitutionality of criminal jury trials
being held in buiidings which also contain jails or prisons. As discussed above,
even though there is support for the proposition that a jury trial conducted in a
courtroom inside of a jailor prison may violate due process rights, Dixon has

Of course, it is likely the district court was personally familiar with the Kootenai
County Public Safety Building courtroom, having presided over numerous jury
trials there. (#39745 R., p.90.)
4

10

to
venue
an objective
R., pp.

on a novel

new trails

venue

Idaho
had
If Dixon's

to

a

then every other

in

was

ineffective as well. Further, .!...!..:=-.!.!.!..!.;=~:..:....::;=.:...:.;::., the only case cited by Dixon in
his briefing below

regard to this issue, could

have

known to Dixon's

attorney because it was published four years after Dixon's
Additionally, Dixon has failed to demonstrate prejudice that resulted from
court concluded, any motion to change the

any deficiency. As
venue would have

denied.

(#39745 R., pp.105-106.)

trial

In making this

determination, the district court was persuaded by two dissenting opinions in
(ld.)

In

case, one of the dissenting opinions

reasoned:
According to the majority, James Frank Jaime's due process
right to the presumption of innocence was violated when his trial
was held in a permanent courtroom in the county jail building Gail
building courtroom}. I cannot agree. i would
that the practice of

11

on cases
involving shackles and prison garb. While there is no doubt that it is
inherently prejudicial to shackle a defendant during trial, or force a
defendant to wear prison garb during trial, conducting a trial in a
permanent courtroom in the jail building does not
the same
constitutional concerns. Shackling can
of such a physical
restraint as to deprive a defendant of the right to appear and defend
himself or herself. Shackling is also a very visible
that
indicates to the jury
defendant is so dangerous as to not
trusted even by the judge. Similarly, a defendant who is forced to
wear prison garb is distinctly marked as a dangerous or guilty
person.
But Jaime's entitlement "to the physical indicia of innocence"
is
; it confers
the defendant to be brought before
the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a
and innocent man," not to choose a particular courtroom. A
courtroom is a location, not an accoutrement.
Because a
courtroom does not serve as an
it does
possess
inherently prejudicial power
a
or a prison uniform. While
some aspects of a court setting may cause prejudice in certain
cases, there simply is no basis to conclude that the practice of
conducting trials in a jail building courtroom is always and
inherently prejudicial.
Jaime, 233 P.3d at 872-876 (Fairhurst J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations
omitted); see

id. at 877-880 (Johnson J., dissenting) ("The majority

contradicts the presumption of juror responsibility, intelligence, and honesty when
it summarily concludes that 'the average juror would draw a[n] [improper]
inference' about a defendant's guilt from the fact that trial was held in a jail
courtroom.").

Even had Dixon's counsel objected to the jury trial venue, such a

motion would have been unsuccessful.
Dixon has failed to show either that his trial counsel was deficient for
failing to object to the trial venue, or that he was prejudiced by the lack of such
12

pp.1

that
manner
in

failed to

n.-",<:con'!'

either any physical
his injury.

any potential expert might have testified to
claim is thus entirely speculative,

has

rlC'!"-"''!'O

Because his
either that

deficiency.

counsel was deficient, or that he was

B.

A petitioner for post-conviction relief

the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on
LC.R.

. Estes, 111 Idaho at, 436, 725 P.2d at 141.

117

at

trial court's decision

burden of proof is entitled to great weight.

has not

that the

claim is based.

792

at

13

court conducts a

fact
disturb

an appellate

conclusions
are

by

those

district court

276-77,971 P.2d at 729-730. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight
to be given to
are ail

testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence
solely within the province of the district court.

at

139 Idaho

P.3d at 110.

c.
As

above, an attorney's performance is not constitutionally

unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there
is a strong presumption that counsel's

is

wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Gibson, 110 Idaho at 634, 718 P.2d at 286;
Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable
of objective evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68. Trial
counsel need not pursue ali potential assistance from experts.
Richter, _

Harrington v.

U.S. at _ , 131 S.Ct. at 770,787-90 (2011) (counsel not ineffective

for failing to procure forensic blood experts for trial).
In this case, Dixon presented extensive trial testimony about his injury,
how he suffered it, and how it impacted him. (Trial Tr., p.294, L.22 - p.300, L.17.)
Dixon described, in detail, how he suffered a severe laceration to his left forearm

14

5-

L.1

scar

)

no

(See
or
trial.

testimony that
.)

(See generally 12/10/10

thus failed to substantiate his claim. See

-,-,-"..:::..:..:...=......::c.:..--=.::.::='

711, 185 P.3d 921, 926-927 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding
alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for
certain witnesses, "[i]t is not enough to allege that a

145 Idaho

Dixon
770-

where a post-conviction
to investigate

call

would have testified

to certain events, or would have rebutted certain statements made at
providing through affidavit, non hearsay evidence

the substance

witnesses' testimony" (citation omitted)). Dixon has failed to show that the
court erred by denying his entirely speculative claim of attorney
at the evidentiary hearing, Dixon's
was

decision not to seek the assistance of

15

counsel indicated that it
witnesses.

cou

was
as soon as
it

and retain

"didn't want to wait." (ld.)
he was prejudiced by
nature of

claim,

his injury was so severe as to
own testimony ind
the

the state's

his

ificantly
-

of
80

300, L 17.)

by

G.

the incident. (Trial Tr.,

L.2.)

a firefighter/EMT

scene

that he did

actually examined Dixon's
of

would indicate "some sort of trauma." (Trial Tr., p.251,

or
18 - p.252,

Additionally, Dixon cannot establish that he was prejudiced by any
deficiency in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt presented at trial.
Dixon was observed to be heavily intoxicated prior to
expressing

attack, and was heard

plan to "go get [himself] a 12-year-old" (Trial Tr., p.280, L5 -

p.284, L.25.) K.G. identified Dixon as the attacker, both at the scene immediately
after the incident and at trial. (Trial Tr., p.56, L 18 - p.57, L 12; p.60, Ls.9-14;
p.201, L 18 - p.203, L 16.) Two bystanders, while not in a position to be able to
see the lewd conduct act itself, corroborated much of K.G.'s account of the
interaction with Dixon, and were able to identify him.
105, L2; p.119, L4-p.123,

g.)

16

(Trial Tr., p.96, L 14 -

is

in

of a

reviewed Dixon's
fails

his attempt to

ineffective assistance

counsel claims

records.

.)

LR.C.P. 60(b) to
were previously

not constitute "unique and compelling"

conviction

B.

ncn,,,,,,--

Standard Of Review
decision to deny or grant relief

to a

60(b)

is

reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard."
1

Idaho

547, 149 P.3d 819, 822 (2006) (citing

"':"":":':-'--'!:..'--'-!..:.==.:..:l..-!.:":'::::':"'''':''':'

"":"':"':::':"':'::::"'==.l-!..!...:.=' 137 Idaho 747,753,53 P.3d 330, 336 (2002)).

17

C.
LRC.P. 60(b) Motion

"from a final judgment,

or proceeding" for

.. reason justifying relief

from the operating of the judgment" \Nhile the language of LRC.P. 60(b)(6) is
broad, the rule

clearly defined

793 P.2d 1263 (Ct

1990).

Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091,
party making an I. R C.P. 60(b )(6) motion

and compelling" circumstances justifying relief.

kL;

148 Idaho 731, 736, 228 P.3d 998, 1003 (2010).

An

must demonstrate

I.RC.P. 60(b)(6) motion cannot be a disguised substitute for a timely appeaL
.!..-.::::.J::::.!..!.::::!.-!..:-!..-=~, 105 Idaho

testified

h is I.

669 P.2d 191 (1983).

P. 60(b )(6) hearing and repeated much

trial testimony regarding the cause and nature of

arm

his

(#40761 R,

pp.12-13. 6 ) He also submitted an affidavit from a physical therapist who did not
actually examine Dixon, but reviewed his medical records and concluded that at
the time of the attack, Dixon "could not physically have lifted anything

moderate/medium weight with his left upper extremity."

(#40761 R, p.13;

1/17/12 Affidavit (agumentation).) Dixon argued that his trial attorney "dropped
the ball" by not presenting such medical evidence at the trial. (#40761 R, p.13.)
Dixon also brought his motion pursuaht to I.RC.P. 60(b)(1) and (2). (10/5/11
Motion (augmentation).) However, Dixon has pursued only the I.RC.P. 60(b)(6)
component of his motion on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.)
5

The appellate record appears to contain the minutes (#40761 R, pp.2-14), but
not a transcript, of the hearing on Dixon's I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion. Missing
portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court.
State v. Mowery, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333 (1996); State v. Beck, 128
Idaho 416,422,913 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1996).
6

18

c

On

!

Dixon relies on

=:;:;..~-=..::=

a

a
conviction proceeding over

Court

course of several years, ultimately

court's dismissal of the petition,

In

constitute "unique and compelling"

circumstances warranting relief from

dismissal pursuant to LRC.P. 60(b)(6).

148 Idaho at 736-738, 228 P.3d at 1003-1005.

However, Eby has no

application to the present case. Unlike Eby, Dixon had the opportunity, through
counsel, to present his post-conviction claims to the district court.

did not

transform I RC.P. 60(b)(6) into an avenue for individuals to pursue ordinary
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that have already been rejected in
post-conviction proceedings.
Dixon also appears to assert, for the first time on appeal, that
should have granted his I.RC.P. 60(b)(6) motion on the
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district
that

post-conviction
did not make
I.

C.P.

60(b)(6)

was ineffective. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.) However,
district court in the course of

argument to
(See

#40761

10/5/11

12-14;

Motion

(augmentation).) This Court should not consider this argument because Dixon
121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126. ("The

failed to preserve it.

longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are
presented for the first time on appeal.").

In any event, the state asserts that

assertions that post-conviction counsel inadequately raised a claim cannot
generally constitute "unique and compelling" circumstances warranting I. R. C. P.
60(b )(6) relief.
and compelling" circumstances to the

Because he presented no

court which necessitated I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

has failed to show

that the district court abused its discretion in denying his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion.
This Court should therefore affirm the district court's decision.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denial of Dixon's petition for post-conviction relief, and its denial of his I.R.C.P.
60(b )(6) motion.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2014

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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